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Abstract
In 1999, after a heated debate on gender parity in political representation, the French constitution was amended to in-
clude the principle of “equal representation” of both sexes. This paved the way for the introduction of gender quotas.
In the same period, a bill providing reservations for women at the national level provoked a political crisis in India. The
objective of this article is to compare both debates, looking in particular at the way women’s representation was framed.
In France, the main argument against quotas was that republican representation should be unitary and transcend social
differences, but at the end of the 1990s, women in mainstream politics were seen as one element of the dual nature of
human kind, different from other categories such as class or race. In India, the specific representation of certain groups
(Dalits, lower castes, tribal groups) had been the traditional framework for political representation since independence
in 1947. But when the bill proposed to extend reservations to women, opponents of the project claimed that women did
not constitute a category in themselves, and that sex should be intersected with caste and religion for the attribution of
quotas. Looking at parliamentary debates, articles, and tribunes supporting or opposing quotas in both countries, we show
that the arguments mobilized reveal different conceptions of the political representation of gender difference, which are
partly transversal and partly specific to each country.
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1. Introduction
In the 1970s, women represented 1.6%of the Assemblée
Nationale, or the lower house of the French Parliament
(1973) and 3.5% of the representatives elected to the Lok
Sabha in India (1977). Although French women seemed
to be in a better position than Indian women (if one com-
pares indicators such as level of education, workforce
participation or sexual and reproductive rights), their po-
litical representation was very low, and even lower than
in India. There was little progress in this area until 1999
when, after a heated debate on parity, the French con-
stitution was amended to include the principle of “equal
representation” of both sexes, which paved the way to
the introduction of a system of gender quotas at all lev-
els of government. During the same period, in 1996, the
Women’s reservation bill was introduced in the lower
house of the Indian Parliament to “reserve” 33% of the
legislative constituencies forwomen (i.e.,menwould not
be allowed to stand in those constituencies). Although
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officially supported by parties across the political spec-
trum, this bill was never adopted (it was passed in the
upper house in 2010, but not by the lower house). Three
decades later, the situation has changed dramatically in
France, where the 2018 legislature includes 39.7% of
women, but less impressively in India, where the share
of female MPs rose to a record 14% after the 2019 elec-
tions. This result is intriguing, because quotas were com-
pletely absent from French political culture, whereas
they had a long history in India and had been introduced
for women at the local level without much controversy
in 1992 (Ghosh & Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2005). One could
argue that the greater inclusion of women in the French
representative system reflects their overall better po-
sition in this society, but this was already the case in
the 1970s, and comparative numbers at the global level
show that there is no systematic connection between
women’s emancipation in society and their presence in
parliaments (Achin, 2005).
The objective of this article is not to provide an en-
compassing response as to why the policy of equal rep-
resentation was adopted in France and rejected in India.
To answer this question, one would need not only to
examine the debates on the subject, but also the so-
ciology of the different stakeholders, as well as their
interactions in the political field (Achin, 2005; Dutoya,
2014). Similarly, we will not enter into a detailed analy-
sis of the implementation of quotas or their outcomes in
terms of public policies, which have been studied quite
extensively in both countries (Achin & Lévêque, 2014;
Bereni, 2015; Bhavnani, 2009; Chattopadhyay & Duflo,
2004). In this article, we will underline a more specific
factor: the ideological frames that contributed to this
story, focusing on the 1990s. Indeed, in spite of strik-
ing differences, the debates in each country focused
on whether what Hannah Pitkin (1967) has called “de-
scriptive representation” should apply to women, and
whetherwhat Anne Phillips (1995) has named “politics of
presence” should enable an increase in women’s voices
and concerns. While this issue has been addressed both
for France and India (Dudley Jenkins, 1999; John, 2000;
Lépinard, 2007), this article aims to bring together and
compare the debates in these two countries.
As such, India and France may seem to be two dis-
parate cases in a wide “quotawave” that went from Latin
America to Asia and Europe (Krook, 2009). While this
is not the first time we find such a comparison, previ-
ous attempts have been largely restricted to descriptions,
focusing on the mechanisms of institutional innovation
rather than on their framing (Krook, 2005); or relayed
on the basis of a superficial understanding, to support
one of the case studies (Menon, 2004, pp. 182–194). But
comparing these two countries is particularly interesting
for our study, which focuses on the ideological frames of
women quotas. First, France and India constructed their
representative systems in opposition to the two most
widespread types of regime that existed prior to repre-
sentative government, the Old Regime in the case of the
French Republic, the colonial system in the case of the
Indian Union. Due to the political significance of both
countries, their frames can be viewed as two of themost
important for the Global North and the Global South re-
spectively. France and India also illustrate the two major
systems for introducing gender quotas at the world level:
these are the “candidate quota system”, which requires
parties to present a certain percentage of female can-
didates in elections, dominant in Europe, America, East-
and South-East Asia and some African countries, and the
“reserved seat system”, which sets aside a certain num-
ber of seats for female representatives, more common
in Africa, the Middle-East and South Asia (Hinojosa &
Piscopo, 2013). In both countries, the projected reform
was adopted as a constitutional amendment that encour-
aged a specific and sophisticated form of argumentation,
in which positions were formulated in relation to the fun-
damental values of the Republic in France, and the Union
in India. Thus, in both countries, the debate on quo-
tas revealed underlying conceptions of citizenry, political
representation, and gender difference. Comparing these
two cases helps us understand how these conceptions
contributed to the acceptability of quotas for women,
but also the specific shape they took in each country.
Lastly, India and France are interesting cases to show
both the global connections established around quotas,
as well as the local ruptures. Indeed, the debates about
quotas in France and India contribute to the construc-
tion of a global rationale for women’s quotas that has in-
volved conflicting definitions of political representation
and produced one of the most impressive series of insti-
tutional political innovations in the world. In this regard,
connected history (Subrahmanyam, 1997) helps us cut
“across chronological and institutional divides shaped by
Eurocentrism” (Douki & Minard, 2007). Connecting the
French and Indian cases disturbs the “Grand Narrative
of Modernization” (Subrahmanyam, 1997, p. 145) that
generally centres democratic innovation in Europe and
the North, and illustrates the transfers that have been
crucial at the transnational level to explain the gender
quota wave.
In order to understand the differences and similari-
ties between the French and Indian framing of the po-
litical representation of gender difference, we will first
localize the emergence of women’s quotas in these two
countries within the global movement towards quotas
for women, paying attention to the specificities of the
type of quotas adopted in each country. In the sec-
ond part, we will stress the fact that both India and
France had developed strong so-called “universalistic”
conceptions of political representation, which were chal-
lenged when the representative claim (Saward, 2006) to
increase the women’s share in parliaments gained legiti-
macy. We will carry out a detailed study of the different
reinterpretations of these “universalistic” frames, when
confronted with gender difference, and their impact on
the fate of women’s quotas. To do this, we combine and
reassess two independent studies. One looks at the de-
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 124–136 125
bates about reservations in India, while the other analy-
ses the issue of parity in France. Both surveys relied on
the discursive analysis of parliamentary debates (which
were systematically analysed and coded), and a study of
the local press, on which the present article will focus.
The surveys also include interviews (about 40 in India
and 25 in France) with stakeholders involved in the de-
bate (MPs, party office bearers and feminists) and, in
France, participant observation in feminist debates (see
the Methodological Appendix).
2. The Connected Histories of Indian and French
Quotas
2.1. A Global Shift towards Quotas
The need for a global understanding of women’s quotas
has been convincingly defended by numerous authors
(Waylen, 2015), including in the cases of France and India
(Dutoya, 2016; Krook, 2009; Lépinard, 2007; Murray,
2012; Scott, 2005). Although it is not within the scope
of this article to reiterate this argument, it is important
to briefly highlight its main features. The global discus-
sion on women’s political representation began during
the United Nations Decade for women, launched after
the firstWorld Conference onWomen inMexico, in 1975.
It took place at different forums, for instance with the
discussions around the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW;
United Nations, 1979). Adopted in 1979 by the United
Nations General Assembly, the CEDAW encouraged mea-
sures to ensure women’s political participation (Art. 3),
including “temporary special measures aimed at accel-
erating de facto equality between men and women”
(Art. 4). However, the real shift occurred when the
Fourth World Women’s Conference in Beijing (1995) rec-
ommended the introduction of a minimum quota of
30% of women in parliaments. In the decade prior to
the Beijing Conference, only ten countries had intro-
duced a women’s quota, starting with Argentina in 1991
(Hinojosa & Piscopo, 2013). Ten years later, more than
100 countries had adopted this policy. At the European
level, a rationale for “equality of results” or “substantive
equality” was developed to replace the traditional lib-
eral and republican “equality of opportunities” and “for-
mal equality”. The Council of Europe, a looser but geo-
graphically broader institution than the European Union,
played a major role in promoting women’s representa-
tion after 1989, adopting the keyword parity and mak-
ing it a part of the public debate by organizing numerous
conferences and publishing reports (among others Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 1997, 1999). These global discus-
sions had a local impact. They contributed to the emer-
gence of substantive equality as the dominant paradigm
and the legitimation of quotas to ensure women’s polit-
ical representation. Experiments travelled and countries
could draw from achievements elsewhere. Global arenas
were also sites of learning, socialization and networking
for feminists, who used them to strengthen their local le-
gitimacy (Lépinard, 2007, pp. 35–76).
France and India are good examples of the local im-
pact of global discourses. Although transfers did not oc-
cur directly between these two countries, indirect con-
nections played a certain role, through the actions of
transnational actors and during the World Women’s con-
ferences. In India, the discussion around quotas began
during the preparations for the 1975 Mexico conference
when the Indian government nominated a special com-
mittee to examine the issue. The Committee on the
Status of Women in India (CSWI) concluded that, while
the 1950 Constitution gave women equal status as citi-
zens, this formal equality had not translated into substan-
tive equality (CSWI, 1974). Though the report rejected
quotas, it re-ignited the debate within the women’s
movement, as it showed the failure of the strategy of for-
mal equality. The government also took up the issue and,
in 1992, two constitutional amendments granted women
33% reservations in local level institutions. In France, al-
though the idea of quotas for women can also be traced
back to the 1970s (Bereni, 2015, p. 37), the campaign for
parity only started in the early 1990s, and became part of
the mainstream even later, in the mid-1990s. One of its
starting points was the common declaration adopted in
Athens in 1992 in the context of a conference organized
by the European Commission, calling for an egalitarian
distribution of political power between men and women
(Lépinard, 2007, p. 46). In 1999, a constitutional amend-
ment introduced the objective of equality between men
and women in political representation. In the following
years, various laws made it mandatory to present an
equal number of men and women for elections under
the proportional system (European, regional and munici-
pal), and reduced public funding for political parties par-
ticipating in legislative elections that do not present the
same number of male and female candidates under the
majority rule system (the presidential election was not
affected). In fact, as the international literature on quo-
tas predicted (Hinojosa & Piscopo, 2013), this has worked
quite well for the former but far less for the latter, and
other laws, together with the evolution of mentalities,
have been necessary to move towards a more balanced
parliament, 18 years after the constitutional amendment.
2.2. Women’s Representation as a Marker of Modernity
and Modernization
The way the debates unfolded in India and France shows
that in the 1990s, women’s representation became a
global marker of political modernity or of the modern-
ization of political life. Nevertheless, it was embedded
in different kinds of rhetoric. In India, this connection
was particularly explicit during the discussions about the
Women’s reservation bill in Parliament. Many MPs in-
sisted that women’s reservations would bring about a
historical change and create the “India of tomorrow” in
the “world of the 21st century” (Lok Sabha Secretariate,
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1996). Themodernity that Indiawas supposed to achieve
through women’s representation was also understood in
terms of the nation’s position in the international arena.
Just as the “women’s question” was one of the sites of
the colonial encounter in the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies (Mani, 1987), it is now a global issue (Cîrstocea,
Lacombe, & Marteu, 2018). In this context, those in
support of women’s quotas made numerous references
to international standards in the press (Bhagat, 1997;
Times of India, 2009) and in Parliament. For instance, a
Communist MP argued that “the developmental degree
of a nation is judged by the status of women. If that is
the principle by which we are going to judge India, then
we are far behind” (A. K. Premajan, as cited in Lok Sabha
Secretariate, 2000, p. 706).
In France as well, those who defended quotas in-
sisted on the fact that the “land of human rights” could
not further delay increasing the presence of women in
politics (Bereni, 2015). But while in India, because of the
(post)colonial context, the country’s position in interna-
tional rankings was seen as critical, this was less so in
France where the main argument centered on the in-
ternal necessity to modernize the political system. After
the consecutive defeats of both the Socialist and Right-
wing governments in 1993 and 1997, all parties were
weakened and faced a deep crisis of legitimacy. Opinion
polls showed the French citizens’ growing distrust in po-
litical life and political leadership. The corruption scan-
dals that affected both the Left and the Right were the
most visible symptom of the gap between ordinary peo-
ple and the political “class”. In this context, both the Right
and Left became advocates of a “modernization of polit-
ical life” that was supposed to reduce this gap. As the
word parity had been popularized at the European level,
many politicians suddenly saw it as a necessary part of
the modernization process (Bereni, 2015), illustrating a
more general potential relationship between democratic
crises and the potential for engendering politics (Waylen,
2015). A further advantage in a time of economic reces-
sion was that it involved no financial cost.
2.3. The “Vernacularization” of Quotas
In both cases, the call for democratic modernity, or the
modernization of political life, was made in reference
to global arenas. Nevertheless, the need to increase
women’s representationwas also re-inscribed in local his-
tories, particularly the nationalist struggle in India, and
republicanism in France. This phenomenon can be read
as a sort of “vernacularization”, to use the Indian notion
that designates not only the process of translation but
also the appropriation and re-signification of a general
concept or idea in local cognitive contexts. Interestingly,
in both countries, the universalist conception of repre-
sentation, based on individuals rather than groups, was
not framed as liberal, as in the majority of international
literature, but as republican in the French case and as
the guarantee of national unity in India (Bajpai, 2016). In
both countries, the term “quota”, which was the most
widespread at the international level, was conspicuously
absent and replaced by “reservations” (or aarakshan in
Hindi) in India and “parity” (parité) in France. In India, the
global discussion on quotas reactivated an older debate,
as women’s representation had been discussed from the
1920s onwards (Forbes, 1979). Moreover, political reser-
vations to ensure the representation of scheduled castes
(also known as Dalits and “untouchables”) and tribes ex-
isted since independence, and had been later extended
to lower castes (Jaffrelot, 2003). Thus, the discussions
around women’s reservations that began in the 1970s,
and unfolded in the following decades, referred not only
to global debates on women’s representation, but also
to the local history of quota and group representation.
In France, there was no pre-existing instrument that
could accommodate the demand for women’s represen-
tation. On the contrary, the French republican tradition
was averse to the specific representation of social groups.
The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen (which has Constitutional value) states:
As all citizens are equal in the eye of the law, posi-
tions of high rank, public office and employment are
open to all on an equal basis according to ability and
without any distinction other than that based on their
merit or skill. (National Assembly of France, 1789)
Moreover, article three of the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic (Government of the French Republic, 1958)
adds that “no group (section) of people, nor any in-
dividual, may lay claim to the exercise” of National
Sovereignty. In 1982, theNational Assembly almost unan-
imously passed a bill stating that no party list in munic-
ipal elections shall consist of more than 75% of candi-
dates of the same sex, but the French equivalent of the
Supreme Court (Conseil Constitutionnel) over-ruled the
law as unconstitutional.
When the Council of Europe popularized the term
parity, it tended to present it as a 50% quota, more rad-
ical than the 30% quotas defended at the international
level after the Beijing conference. Europe had to be at
the forefront of the path for gender equality. When the
word parity was adopted in France, however, its meaning
was defined quite differently to suit the republican nar-
rative. It was defended as the sign of a “national excep-
tion” (Lépinard, 2007, p. 129) regarding the gender or-
der. Parity was presented by mainstream politicians and
a large group of intellectuals and feminists as very differ-
ent from “quotas”, which were seen as belonging to the
North American tradition. While quotas were defined as
a tool for “group” or “minority” representation parity
claimed to be “universal in nature”, or related to the uni-
versal and natural division of mankind betweenmen and
women (Bereni, 2015, p. 189). On the contrary, in India,
women’s quotas had to be adjusted within a reservation
system that already recognized groups on the basis of
caste and tribal status.
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3. Two Forms of Universalistic Representation and
Their Challenges
3.1. Only Paradoxes to Offer
Joan Scott (1996) has coined the dilemma and para-
doxes faced by French women—especially feminists—
in the so-called universalistic republican frame. French
republicanism has imposed its universalistic frame on
groups that have legally or de facto been excluded from
political representation. Therefore, members of these
groups have faced a paradox. They have often contested
their exclusion and demanded to be represented as a
group—but this is nearly impossible because the re-
publican frame and the very notion of universal rights
seem inhospitable to the idea of group representation.
But when opting to claim recognition only as individu-
als, most have remained powerless in this universalis-
tic structure, which has de facto deprived them of rep-
resentation precisely as members of a subaltern group.
Women had been excluded or marginalized in political
representation because of their sexual difference, which
was supposed to establish them in the realm of nature
(vs. politics), of the private (vs. the public), of feelings and
emotions (vs. reason)—all of which are opposed to the
universal, disembedded, rational and autonomous citi-
zen. Hence they either had to vindicate themselves as
women, as sexually different, relying on a category con-
structed specifically to exclude them; or they had to try
to gain full citizenship by identifying themselves with the
other side of the dichotomy, the unencumbered, rational
and autonomous citizen, i.e., with a figure constructed
for men as distinct from women.
At first glance, the political field may seemmore con-
ducive to women’s group representation in India, as fem-
ininity was recognized early on as a political resource; be
it symbolically or practically. Not only did the national
struggle draw heavily on the imagination of the moth-
erland, Hinduism (the religion of about 80% of Indians)
offers a vast array of powerful goddesses, which contra-
dict the idea of a passive and helpless femininity (Basu,
1996). In particular, women were crucial actors in the
nationalist struggles (Thapar-Björkert, 2006). Then, the
Government of India Act of 1935, a de facto constitu-
tion, provided for reserved seats for women, long be-
fore the 1990s, which makes India the first country in
which such a measure was implemented. Third, other
groups (religiousminorities and so-called “depressed” or
“backward” castes) were also granted reservations, and
in some cases separate electorates. Thus, group repre-
sentation does not constitute the same taboo in India as
in France.
However, Indian women also had to face a para-
dox. Although group representation seemed available
and women could use cultural and historical resources
to impose themselves in politics, they chose not to
do so. Given their origins, reservations were associated
with the colonial strategy of “divide and rule”. And
they indeed divided India. In the 1930s, the Congress
Party, led by a majority of upper caste and class Hindus,
wanted to break with separate electorates and reserva-
tions and rely solely on the principle of “one person, one
vote”. Minority groups, especially those deemed partic-
ularly vulnerable or having distinctive interests (notably
“backward castes” and religious minorities), claimed the
perpetuation of separate electorates or at least reser-
vations. This was a classical dilemma in the former
British colonies (Mamdani, 2012) and it contributed
to the partition between India and Pakistan. Among
Indian nationalists, the debate was also tense. Some,
like B. R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitutional
Committee and the main porte-parole of the Dalits
(around 15% of Indian population), wanted the abolition
of castes but believed in affirmative action and there-
fore proposed separate elections for the different castes
during a transitory period. Others, like Gandhi, opposed
this perspective and defended a position similar to the
French traditional Republicans. In this context, women
became the champion of a universalist definition of cit-
izenship, refusing a division of women along commu-
nal lines, and defending adult franchise without privi-
leges (Forbes, 1979). According to Mrilani Sinha (2007),
the major all-India women’s organizations of the 1930s
proposed women as the model for the “universal cit-
izen” of independent India. Though this position had
not prevented the division of the women’s movement
(and of the subcontinent), the women in the Constituent
Assembly maintained it. They refused any form of quota,
arguing that they trusted that “all women who are
equally capable…as men will be considered irrespective
of sex” (Renuka Ray, as cited in Lok Sabha Secretariate,
1947, p. 668). Thus, while the representatives of sched-
uled tribes and castes put forth their difference and the
need for special political rights, the women’s represen-
tatives (who claimed this status and were recognized as
such) refused such distinctions. For the leadership of the
ruling party, it was considered:
A matter for congratulation that women have come
forward to say that they do not want any special treat-
ment. But at the same time, it is a matter of regret
that men have not yet come up to that standard.”
(Vallabhbhai Patel as cited in Lok Sabha Secretariate,
1947, p. 674)
In this regard, while the Indian conception of representa-
tion accepted the idea of quotas, women chose to reject
them, preferring to be recognized as equal by the party
leadership and the elite to which they belonged.
3.2. Political Representation and the Debate on Parity
In France, the mapping of the debate in the second half
of the 1990s shows a peculiar configuration (Sintomer,
2007). The existing literature has rightly shown that the
dual concept of gender has played a role (Lépinard, 2007;
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Murray, 2012), but it has overlooked the fact that this
duality was not universally defended and the meaning
of gender difference was interpreted from quite differ-
ent perspectives. Three groups fought against the parity
reform (see Table 1). The first consisted of the classical
sexistswho consider women less capable than men, and
less motivated to become representatives. Philippe de
Gaulle, son of the former French President, was quite iso-
lated when he said in 2000:
Since the world is the world, woman does something
great, and the reason why she exists on earth is to
have children! All the world’s discoveries have been
made byman, because it is he who possesses creative
imagination. (Le Monde, 2000)
Despite the number of classical sexists that still exist, this
position is unacceptable in public discourse, and is rarely
heard today.
The second position opposed to parity is that
expressed by the classical republicans (Amar, 1999,
pp. 15–22, 35–39). Political representation, they say,
radically transcends any social or natural differences.
A Right-wing MP quoting the French philosopher Alain
Renaut said:
One of the greatest achievements of the Republic…is
that the subject of rights is neither a man nor a
woman, neither a Jew nor a White or a Black, neither
young nor old, neither landowner nor the opposite,
neither rich nor poor: it is the human as such.
Deputies represent the nation as such, and not any
particular group….Any proportional representation of
diversity, any parity or quota principle, refers to a per-
spective more reminiscent of Nuremberg’s laws dur-
ing the Nazi regime than any democratic idea….There
are other minorities…: quotas for the most disadvan-
taged, for Muslims, for those who live in poor neigh-
bourhoods will be necessary….This is the cycle that
will be induced by the weakening of republican equal-
ity”. (D. Julia, as cited in Assemblée Nationale, 1998)
To introduce a difference among the Sovereign people
would therefore open a Pandora’s box of communitar-
ian divisions; it would import notions of identity politics
and affirmative action into the French Republic, i.e., typi-
cally American products that have failed even in theUS. It
would ultimately destroy the Republic through the ‘balka-
nization’ of the public sphere. This discourse, a hege-
monic one in the past, is still widespread among politi-
cians and academics, but it has lost most of its appeal for
the public.
Radical Marxists and deconstructionistsmake up the
third group. While this position held little appeal for
politicians or the electorate, it nonetheless had a cer-
tain influence among the feminists in the 1970s (Amar,
1999, pp. 11–14), and the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu
(1998/2001) held a similar position. Their argument was
that women cannot claim equal representation using the
concept of parity, which is ultimately based on the dual-
ism that was constructed to exclude them. “Women, no
more than men, are as such a homogeneous social cate-
gory”, wrote feminist intellectuals in a manifesto:
Human kind is multiple, and so are social antago-
nisms. To claim political parity between men and
women within the framework of rules and codes
that have excluded women and benefited some, al-
though not all men, is…to nourish the illusion of real
representation…and risks legitimising the social and
political sexual difference, which has been socially
constructed….It reproduces the masculine model.”
(Hirata, Kergoat, Riot-Sarcey, & Varikas, 1999)
The problem was therefore not only to reverse the hi-
erarchy in the duality between men and women, but
also to contest all the oppressive categories that force
individuals to respect gender roles. Furthermore, par-
ity would only replace male politicians by a parity polit-
ical class while abolishing or deconstructing representa-
tive democracy.
The supporters of parity were equally divided
(see Table 1). According to differentialist feminists
(Kristeva, 1999), women andmen are different by nature.
She wrote:
As soon as the One becomes embodied and meta-
physics diffidently tries to become concerned with a
humanity which is living because plural, it begins to
recognize differences, and the first difference is the
sexual difference, which is irreducible to the other dif-
ferences because it is the foundation of the political
life of the human species. When supporters of par-
ity place the focus on the vocation of maternity, in
Table 1. A conceptual map of the French debate.
Types of argument concerning the relation
between the social and the political Parity opponents Parity supporters
Essentialist Classical sexists Differentialist feminists
Transcendental/“universalist” Classical republicans Parity republicans
Constructivist Radical Marxists and Deconstructionists Pragmatist egalitarians
Source: the authors.
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the long run, they are promising a political destiny to
the large majority of women and mothers who would
wish to become involved. (Kristeva, 1999)
Women have different values, concerns, behaviours, in-
terests and experiences than men, which have been
marginalized in the public sphere and in political rep-
resentation. Thus, an increase in the political presence
of women would improve political representation: be-
cause of their potential maternity, women care for oth-
ers whereas men care for power. Though this argument
constituted a specific position for aminority of older gen-
eration feminists, it was widespread as a secondary ar-
gument among other women (and even some men), be
they politicians, young feminists, or ordinary citizens.
Parity republicans composed the second group
(Halimi, 1997). They also relied on the duality between
men and women, and considered it a social construct
built on sexual difference. “Neither women nor men are
“categories’’….They are the two sexual components of
humanity”. The opponents:
Raise the false spectre of communitarianism. Today
women. Tomorrow Jews, Blacks, homosexuals? A sim-
ple but uncompromising answer: women are not a
community and do not share a community relation-
ship, as defined by sociologists. They are neither a
class, nor an ethnic group, nor a category. They are
present in all these groups. Sexual difference is the
original parameter. Before being a member of a class,
a corporation, and so on, humans are first of all mas-
culine and feminine.” (Halimi, 1994)
But contrary to the claimmade by the differentialist fem-
inists, while the dual structure of gender identity is uni-
versal, the content of gender roles differs in history and
between civilizations. The universalism of former French
republicanismwas abstract because itwas blind to sexual
difference, which led to the monopolization of political
representation bymen. Earlier feminists, such as Simone
de Beauvoir, misled women when encouraging them to
participate in a political life designed for men, without
seeking to modify the rules of the political game. Parity
means that universality has to be envisaged as a dual-
ity. Political parity between women and men would not
open the Pandora’s box of communitarianism as women
are neither a category nor a community but one half of
humanity. Women’s demand for parity has nothing to do
with claims for ethnic, regional, social, or group repre-
sentation. This position was very specific to French polit-
ical discourse. It was influential among academics, femi-
nists and ordinary citizens, and crucial among politicians.
All the political groups in parliament used this argument
to officially justify their position in favour of parity (al-
though it was strongly nuanced by the Communists and
the Greens). This reshaped republicanism was decisive
in explaining why the constitutional law on parity was
approved by 94% of the representatives in a Parliament
dominated by 92%ofmen. The specific representation of
womenwas gaining popularity at a timewhen the idea of
the representation of the working class was fading and
the claim for specific ethnic group representation was
only raised by a tiny minority.
The third group supporting parity was composed of
pragmatist egalitarians. They saw parity more as a tool
than a principle. The hierarchy between the sexes had
been historically constructed, and affirmative action in
politics was necessary to rectify past and present discrim-
inations. This claim “is a stage, necessary, but possibly
provisory—towards equality”, and therefore “a strategy
that aims to overcome masculine domination” (Gaspard,
1998). For Geneviève Fraisse, a philosopher who was re-
sponsible for women’s rights under the government of
the time, parity was “philosophically false” (Bachelot &
Fraisse, 1999, p. 177), because it was based on an es-
sentialist dualism, but it was “true in practice” (quoted
in Tasca, 1998), because it was popular: “Parity is a tool
for equality. There is no need to justify it philosophi-
cally, because it is only a means. The principle is equal-
ity betweenmen and women” (Bachelot & Fraisse, 1999,
p. 177). Pragmatic egalitarians thought that the fight
for parity was positive only if combined with a struggle
against other forms of discrimination (Collective, 1999).
They supported homosexual marriage when most differ-
entialist feminists and a number of parity republicans
strongly opposed it in the name of the “symbolic or-
der” of mankind. Pragmatic egalitarians were influential
among ordinary citizens and probably a majority among
academics and feminists. Although they were in the
minority among politicians, they could prevent the no-
tion of parity from being introduced in the Constitution,
which mentioned only the word “equality”.
It is important to stress that the arguments concern-
ing the relationship between the social and the politi-
cal cut across the opponents, and advocates of parity.
Essentialist, transcendental (or so-called “universalist”)
and constructivist visions were mobilized on both sides.
In addition, although all the advocates of parity referred
to the dichotomy between men and women, they de-
fined it differently. Differentialist feminists had an essen-
tialist vision of the dichotomy, and of sexual difference,
based on a complementarity between two equal groups
constitutive of humanity. Parity republicans put forth
a structuralist vision of sexual dualism and difference:
the complementarity was inevitable but its meaning de-
pended on the historical and social context. Republicans
who supported parity were sceptical of sexual difference,
viewing dualism as a historical construct that could lose
its significance in the future due to affirmative action and
a progressive equalisation of the social and political situ-
ation betweenmen and women. Therefore, they tended
to oppose the claim of complementarity. This complexity
explains why the word equality, rather than parity, was
included in the constitution. It also helps us understand
that, although in the short term, newly-elected women
were largely confined to classical “women’s position” (in
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the social, health care and related fields), especially at
the local level (Lépinard, 2007), this has changed over
time, and a number of strong female politicians have
managed to occupy leading positions, including in the
defence or finance ministries. The same dynamic has
also favoured the discussion of the representation of
ethnic groups under the label “diversity”. Less than two
decades after the constitutional amendment, the dual-
ist position of the republicans who support parity has
been weakened and pragmatist egalitarians occupy cen-
tre stage.
3.3. Conflicting Claims for Group Representation in India
Many of the arguments developed in the debate around
parity in France were also used in India, but they were
connected and hierarchized in a wide range of ways.
As was the case in France, the idea that women were
not competent enough was rarely expressed, or only
as an off the record joke (Dutoya, 2016). While in the
1970s and 1980s therewere debateswithin thewomen’s
movement regarding the nature of gender difference
and the meaning of equality (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2004),
such issues were little discussed in the 1990s and the
idea of gender quotas became fairly consensual (despite
some dissenting voices, see for instance Dhanda, 2000;
Kishwar, 1996). The absence of a debate on these ma-
jor issues in France is largely due to the fact that the
women’s movement’s support for women’s quotas was
mainly justified in pragmatic terms (Dutoya, 2014). As a
member of the communist women’s organization AIDWA
explains; “we saw after 1975 that formal equality was
not working, and we asked for quotas” (Interview in New
Delhi, 2010). Thus, while many feminists were not con-
vinced by arguments regarding the specific “nature” of
women, or their “better heart”, they strategically chose
not to oppose those who used them, especially when
parliamentary debates became particularly heated.
In the Indian Parliament, the idea of the duality of
mankind was latent in many discourses. Many of the
stakeholders in the debate emphasised the specificity of
the gender regime in India, which relied on complemen-
tarity and mutual respect, in contrast to the “war be-
tweenmen and women” that was deemed to exist in the
West. Hence, the objective of reservations for women
was often designated as “bhagidari”, meaning partner-
ship or equal participation (the termwas also used in the
same period to designate a local participatory scheme in
New Delhi) (Ghertner, 2011). In parliamentary debates,
the term “bhagidari” was used to justify the need for
reservations as a consequence ofmen andwomen’s com-
plementarity and partnership, rather than as a measure
to counter gender discrimination and patriarchy as it had
been expressed by the women’s movement in the 1990s
(Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2004).Many stakeholders insisted on
the specificity (and superiority) of India in this respect.
For instance, according to a Member of Parliament be-
longing to the Congress Party:
India is an ancient land that has acknowledged the
feminine divinity and the divinity in the feminine.
Western civilization is still in its formative years, as far
as these concepts are concerned…the Indian model
of preserving the space for women in the society
by providing her respect instead of rights is the sin-
gular distinction between our society and the west-
ern society.” (V. Maitreyan, as cited in Rajya Sabha
Debates, 2010)
Here, both the idea of equality betweenmen andwomen
(marked by universal adult franchise) and complementar-
ity between the sexes are used to justify quotas. This in-
tertwining of two registers of argumentation in favour
of gender quotas (based on difference and equality) was
found to be a common justification for women’s group
representation worldwide (Mcdonagh, 2002). In India as
well, the gender regime is viewed as different, superior,
and implicitly moremodern (as theWest is deemed to be
in its formative years). Ironically, the claim for exceptional-
ity is a common trope that can be found around theworld.
However, the issue of the nature of gender differ-
ence, as such, was not central to the debate in India,
as the main point of contention was the articulation
between women’s representation and group represen-
tation. While it was considered highly problematic in
France, the latter already existed in India, and the ques-
tion was how to combine it with the new representa-
tive claims made by women. Indeed, although many in
the Congress Party did not support quotas at indepen-
dence, they had to work with those who did, particularly
Ambedkar,whoplayed a key role in thewriting of the con-
stitution. As a compromise, separate electorates were re-
jected, but political reservations (as well as reservations
for government jobs and education) were maintained
to ensure the representation of “scheduled castes” (the
Dalits) and “tribes” (Bajpai, 2016). Later, in the 1980s and
1990s, the lower castes, officially called “Other Backward
Classes” (OBC) (around 40% of the Indian population),
also claimed reservations in educational institutions and
the civil services. Political reservations were however
not a strong claim, and in reality the number of OBC
elected representatives, both at the State and federal
level climbed steadily (with important variations depend-
ing on the State), leading to what can be considered
a social democratization of Indian politics in the 1990s,
when the Women’s reservation bill was introduced in
Parliament (Jaffrelot, 2003).
In 1992, in the wave of decentralization and consti-
tution of autonomous local governments (Panchayats),
33% of local government seats were reserved for women
(the number was later raised to 50% in some states)
(Ghosh & Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2005). The difficulty arose
when deciding how to implement women’s reserva-
tions at the state and federal levels. The crucial debate
concerned the manner in which women’s reservations
should be combined with other forms of reservations, or
“quotas within quotas”.
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Indeed, the majority of those opposing the bill be-
longed to parties claiming to defend OBCs and Muslims
(and often belonged to these social groups). They asked
for specific quotas for Muslim and OBC women, claiming
that “their women” (the possessive was frequently em-
ployed) could not be represented by Hindu upper caste
women (see Table 2). Their main argument was that the
category “women” was without substance because of
socio-economic, caste, and religious differences, which
give rise to radically opposed interests. Interestingly
enough, this argument was symmetrically opposed to
the claims of French pro-parity republicans: it stressed
the difference between women and other social de-
pressed groups, but concluded against women’s quotas
if not combined with other dimensions. Male represen-
tatives emphasized the differences between women in
terms of values, behaviour, and even physical appear-
ance, describing women of high caste and class as “so-
phisticated” and Westernized. To quote Sharad Yadav,
OBCMP of the Janata Dal in 1997: “Youwant to crush the
rights of ourwomen. Aboutwhichwomenare you talking
here. We do not want to restrict ourselves for the uplif-
ment [sic] of sophisticated women only” (Sharad Yadav,
as cited in Lok Sabha Secretariate, 1997, p. 384).
Partisans of the bill contested their opponents’ right
to speak in the name of women. Some, especially
women, occasionally rehashed the old argument of
women’s unity beyond caste and religion, but in India,
as elsewhere, most feminist activists and some female
politicians recognized the plurality of situations and the
intersectional dimension of domination. In this com-
pletely different context, they combined the construc-
tivist arguments of both radical Marxists and deconstruc-
tionists with the viewpoint of pragmatic egalitarians in
France. However, it was impossible to find a compro-
mise between those who defended reserved seats for
women and those who proposed “quotas within quo-
tas”. Some feminists suggested beating the opponents
of the bill at their own game, or “calling their bluff” and
accepting quotas within quotas (Interview with a femi-
nist researcher, New Delhi, 2010), but they remained a
minority. Most of the positions expressed by feminists
in interviews or publications showed that while they
were “open” to specific measures for backward class and
Muslim women, they could not align with those who
defended them in Parliament (Dhanda, 2000), deeming
them dishonest and sexist. For instance, commenting on
one of the opponents to the bill, a feminist and head of
an NGO lashed out: “Look at this man, and what he does
to women, he produces 14 children, that’s what he did.
That’s what he thinks about women” (Interview in New
Delhi, 2010).
In any case, major political parties, such as the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress Party
opposed quotas within quotas (particularly for Muslim
women in the case of the BJP) and no compromise
could be found. Many feminists claim that everyone
found this deadlock convenient, as no man wanted the
bill to be passed (Dutoya, 2014). However, the contin-
uous debate over women’s quota probably reinforced
women’s legitimacy in politics. Interestingly, although
the bill was never passed, the number of women candi-
dates and elected representatives has increased steadily
since 1996, though it remains quite low, with 77 women
(14%) elected in the 2019 general elections.
4. Conclusion
In manyways, the issues of parity in France andwomen’s
reservations in India have followed opposing paths.
While in France, parity seemed to gain acceptance sur-
prisingly quickly, given the resistance of the republican
doxa to group representation, in India, the apparent con-
sensus around reservations met with unexpected resis-
tance. Yet, together, the two cases highlight the key role
played by women’s representation in the construction of
what representation is and should be in a global, yet local-
ized discourse on political modernity and modernization.
Many factors explain the failure to impose reservations
in India, from the logics of coalition to the resistance of
the male leadership within parties officially supporting
the bill (Dutoya, 2014). Conversely, in France, the inner
logic of politicians’ strategies in a context of a crisis of le-
gitimacy has been crucial to explaining the success story
of the parity motto. In both cases, however, our article
shows that ideasmatter. Arguments are notmanipulated
at will. The framings have their own rationales and con-
straints, and they imply some path dependency.
Table 2. The main positions in the debate on women’s reservation in India in the 1990s and 2000s.
Supporters of quotas for women as an
Nature of the argument Partisans of quotas within quotas encompassing category
Cultural Upper caste women are Westernized/different Women constitute a group in themselves
and have distinctive qualities-
Constructivist The intersection of caste, gender and religious In a patriarchal society, women have
discriminations produces distinctive distinctive interests and men cannot speak
experiences and interests for women, even in the lower castes
Discrimination based on caste and religion
is a more urgent issue
Source: the authors.
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In India, the inability tomodify the claim for women’s
representation to fit into the existing system of group
representation was a key factor. In particular, in a
rhetoric reminiscent of the 1930s and 40s, the cate-
gory “women” was opposed to other categories based
on caste and religion. Women’s quotas were rejected,
not because the nationalist universalist frame would
have been inhospitable to group representation, but
because gender was not perceived as a criterion fine
enough to identify a group requiring special represen-
tation. Feminists and women’s organization themselves
were not willing to fully abandon the idea of woman as
a universal citizen, unmarked by caste and religion, in a
context where such identities were once again, becom-
ing central to Indian politics.
In France, the slogan parity was efficient because
it could reconcile essentialist, transcendental and con-
structivist arguments related to women’s representation.
The reframing of “republican universalism” in terms of
the dualism that parity was supposed to embody was
a key moment in this process that enabled the adop-
tion of gender quotas and it contrasted strongly with the
social or ethnic group representation familiar to Indian
politics. Nevertheless, two decades later, this new re-
publicanism has nearly disappeared and the universalist
frame is weakening. Women tend increasingly to adopt
non-traditionally “female” roles in politics, and gender
difference is no longer at the forefront. Constructivist
frames have won legitimacy. Group representation and
the equal participation of various groups in politics are
increasingly discussed, beyond an exclusive focus on gen-
der difference. And the claim for a different kind of pol-
itics of presence—social, gender-related and ethnic—is
growing in “the land of human rights”.
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Methodological Appendix: Corpus of the Research
• Indian parliamentary debates between September 1996 andMarch 2010 (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha): consulted at
theNehruMemorialMuseumand Library, andwhen not available there, through the online verbatimmade available
on the institutions’ website (in these cases, the translations was done by the author). A research was carried out on
the basis of key words to identify relevant debates.
• Frenchparliamentary debates between1998 and2000 (available online at the FrenchAssembly and Senatewebsites).
• Indian Press: Systematic analysis of two English language newspapers between 1996 and 2010 (The Hindu and Times
of India), and research by keywords in the news database Factiva.
• French Press: systematic analysis of the sixty most quoted tribunes on the parity issue between 1990 and 2002.
• Interviews in India with MPs (32), feminists (8) and other stakeholders (4) (party office bearers, civil servants and
journalists). Interviews in France with feminists and intellectuals (20).
• Participant observation in the feminist debates in France (1998–2000).
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